Super LP

Midas, Son of Gordias

People think of the Midas Touch as a good thing . . . So did King Midas of Phrygia -- for a while.  After all, what could be better than having everything you touch turn to gold.  Forget quantitative easing and other modern-day Federal Reserve shenanigans; King Midas is the archetype for printing money first and asking questions later . . . 

And, indeed, not thinking through things was the beginning of the end for the good King.  After all, a Golden Touch is an epic gift right up until you need to eat (or in later recountings, hug your daughter.)  So there sat poor Midas with a glass of golden ice where his water had been and plate of gleaming food before him . . . and that's when his belly started getting rumbly.  Pretty soon, Midas cried out to Dionysus to reverse the gift the wine-god had given him (the Touch was payback for helping sober up a lushy-pants satyr.)  Dionysus -- never one to pass up a glass of wine or a chance to teach a lesson -- told Midas to head down to the banks of the river Pactolus and wash everything in its waters, thus returning the gilded items to their original states.  In the end, Midas was poorer, but wiser (for the moment.)

But some cats never learn: Midas decided to take his newfound wisdom and go hang out in the woods for a while with Pan, the god of mischief.  Always feisty, Pan challenged Apollo to a music contest.  Of course, Pan with his rustic pipes stood no chance against Apollo and his Golden Lyre on that week's episode of Olympian Idol.  When the notes were played, all the judges raved that Apollo had the better tune . . . except for Midas.  And not only did he vote against Apollo, but Midas also got mouthy with the Patron of Delphi much like an ancient Simon Cowell.  For his insolence, Apollo said, "you have an ass's ears!" and a pair of floppy donkey ears grew from Midas's head that stuck with him the rest of his days.

Aside from being a great exemplar of the Greek Tragic Cycle, what does this parable have to do with investing?  

Well, first off, you've got to admire Midas for his willingness to be contrarian during the Pan vs. Apollo battle of the bands.  I often note that the fear of being wrong and alone pushes people in finance to do conventional stuff and run with the crowd.  But in doing so, they take the possibility of being right and alone out of play.  This is what Lord Keynes was talking about when he said, "worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally”.  But being non-consensus right is where fortunes and reputations are made; that's the heroic investing quardant.  Of course, Midas probably pushed it a bit far in defying an Olympian god.  Indeed, while Mr. Market can be a harsh taskmaster, underperformance is rarely punished with the rageful pique that the Immortals could muster.  The two-by-two matrix below lays out the scope of outcomes for the financier.

And that's where this post comes full-circle: Back in 2005, I was pitching our then-latest private equity fund of funds offering to a salty investment committee.  Toward the tail end of the discussion, one of the most cynical of the members of that committee asked, "but how many Midas Listers are in your portfolio?" in referring to Forbes' annual ranking of venture captialists.  I started giving an answer that approximated a 2005 version of Dan Primack's critique from this morning, but after a few moments, I stopped and said, "but wait a second: you're not paying us to invest in the Midas List of 1999 -- that's just conventional wisdom --you're really paying us to invest in the people who will be on the Midas List in the 2010s, that's the real challenge.  Some of them might be the same, but many will be different."  I didn't really believe in the Midas List, but the line made for great rhetoric.  I remember that discussion vividly because immedaitely after, I met my friend Josh Kopelman from a then-nascent First Round Capital for the first time for memorable lunch outside of Philadelphia.  

And indeed, while it seemed like a really contrarian move back then to invest in First Round's pre-institutional funds -- among other things we did in those heady early days of the micro-VC movement -- I always knew that there was something disruptive about the voodoo those guys were up to collectively.  Even though I remain pretty cynical about the Midas List, it has been gratifying to see some of the folks I've known for a while in the micro-cap VC space like Josh and now his partner Rob Hayes, Mike Maples and Steve Anderson (and cats like Bryce Roberts in recent years) get some well-deserved recongition.  Congrats to everyone on the List (even if I don't buy into it entirely.)  And thanks for making all of us that invested in you look good.  Keep putting that moolah in the coolah!

Cindy Crawford in a Bar

So Cindy Crawford walks into a bar and a swarm of dudes approach her, brandishing their best pick-up lines:  "Was your father a thief?  Was your uncle a robber?  Well if not, who stole the sparkle from the stars and put it in your eyes?" or, "My, what a beautiful mole you have" and even, "Well, aren't you MILF-y tonight?"

Sounds like the beginning of a joke, no?  Well, actually, welcome to my life!  Well, not just my life, but actually the life of any LP . .  . after all, being the cat with the checkbook can make you the most attractive girl in the bar. And being the hottie of the honky-tonk comes with a cost: an endless stream of pick-up attempts.

And the lines we hear from GPs can be remarkable for their homogeneity.  In fact, when I hear a buyout fund talk about Proprietary Dealflow or Operating Partners, or a healthcare fund talk about the Aging Population or the Patent Expiration Timebomb, I can't help but think that I've heard this story several (hundred) times before.  In fact, I've got a visual reminder in the form of my oppressive inbox of just how many times I've heard some such story.  Here's a sampling:

As you can see, the leftmost column contains the folders I've created for funds that have sent me information since I started at my current employer in mid-2004.  In this view, you can see about 30 of the 452 VC firms with whom I've corresponded.  I have a similar LBO/growth capital folder that contains another 377 firms and an international folder that contains stuff from about 275 additional fund managers.  Add in the 75 managers that are in my "active" bucket (running the gamut from the latest GP over whom I'm breathless to the oldest, most tired fund that 's in run-off mode) and that's close to 1200 funds from San Francisco to Stockholm to Shanghai.  Throw in my tenure at Old Ivy and I probably saw another 300 incremental funds over and above those 1200.  And compared to some other folks on the LP side, that tally of 1500 seems like a rookie's breakfast.  

Speaking of Old Ivy, when I was just starting out as an apprentice in the craft of PE investing I asked an Old Timer in the office about the early days of institutional investments in PE -- I mean, this guy was my Hubble Space Telescope back to the cottage industry-era of the PE universe.  And one thing that he said stuck with me all these years: "in those days, we kind of figured out what kinds of strategies we wanted to back, looked around at the four of five managers who were doing those kinds of things and then invested in about half of them."  Remarkable . . . when I think about my "funnel" today, the line we used in my Old Ivy days seems to ring ever more true with each passing day: "It's harder to get into our portfolio than it is to get into our college."

And I believe that all the competition has to be challenging for overall returns.  Or maybe, paradoxically, overall returns won't suffer as tradecraft generally improves, but instead the dispersion of those returns tightens as the industry professionalizes and best practices are copied and losers fade away and become exemplars of survivorship bias.  In that vein, I'm reminded of a great Stephen Jay Gould article I read about 25 years ago in which he talks about the maturation of an endeavor (in that case baseball) and the disappearance of outcomes that are several standard deviations (positive or negative) off the mean:

"Variation in batting averages must decrease as improving play eliminates the rough edges that great players could exploit, and as average performance moves toward the limits of human possibility … Declining variation arises as a general property of systems that stabilize and improve while maintaining constant rules of performance through time. The extinction of .400 hitting is, paradoxically, a mark of increasingly better play."

What if that's true?  What if the fabled dispersion of top-to-bottom quartile returns starts to narrow, (like the pennant-shaped graphs exhibited by many styles of investing that show wide dispersions in the early, pioneering, wild west years on the left side and narrower spreads in more recent years)? 

Well, one implication may be that the "better execution" story (i.e. "we're good at this") becomes commoditized while the "we're doing something different" story becomes even more compelling.  After all, do I need an n-th mid market buyout fund with operating partners and a geographic focus?  Or the m-th early stage Sand Hill Road firm?  Maybe, maybe not.  That's just post-heroic private equity and there's indeed a place for that in a portfolio as a return enhancer.  But I fear that those types of firms in the aggregate are slouching toward an paradigm of little more than what the public market guys would call enhanced-indexing.

But what about someone who's doing something innovative in style?  Structure?  Terms?  That might add some spice to the portfolio.  That's where the true octane (on a risk-adjusted basis) might lie.  It's definitely the higher volatility play, both in potential returns (for the LP) and in fundraising success (for the GP,) but to do something outstanding takes audacity.  And indeed, private equity should be all about audacity.  After all, heroic investing lives at the intersection of courage and conviction. 

Hey, Hotshot

Remember that epic “Get the Feeling” ad campaign that Sports Illustrated ran during the mid-1980s? I seem to recall some print advertisements and perhaps a television spot or two, but it’s the billboards that peppered Brooklyn during those summers that seared themselves into my memory.

Maybe it was the in-action pictures of larger than life heroes rendered at 14 by 48 foot scale? Or perhaps the provocative captions that asked questions most mortals would never be able to answer? One of my favorites accompanied a mid-swing picture of slugger Don Mattingly: “How Does It Feel To Turn a Slider Into a Souvenir? Get the Feeling. Sports Illustrated.” Then there was the one featuring base stealer extraordinaire Rickey Henderson in his classic “I’m about to run” pose: “How Does It Feel To Know You’re About To Break the Eighth Commandment? Get the Feeling.” Of course, that question was a bit less remote in a neighborhood where “thou shalt not steal” was considered more of a suggestion than a hard-and-fast rule.

But it was an over-head shot of some over-sized state college football stadium that captured my imagination. Splayed out across every inch of Astroturf were dozens upon dozens upon dozens of corn-fed Midwestern boys stretching before an early-season practice, all with one question on their mind: “will I make the squad?” The caption below asked, “How Does It Feel To Know You’re Just Another High School Hotshot?”

And lately, when the day's FexEx drop is particularly bountiful and several more private placement memoranda are added to the pile already strewn about the sidetable in the office, I've wondered if that ad might work just as well for the private equity world.  After all, top quartile funds are as plentiful as fleet-footed recievers out of Ottumwa or Odessa.

Indeed, in 2011 a bumper crop of freshmen will be vying for a limited number of open roster spots.  What factors will seperate the starters from the bench-warmers from the water boys?  This year, simply being good won't be close to being good enough; my own two cents is that too few GPs think critically about what makes them and their strategy truly distinctive and defensble. 

So in honor of the new year -- and the inevitable flood of funds expected to come to market in 2011 -- I thought I'd focus the first few posts of the year on fundraising, offering over the coming weeks some going-to-market observations, tips, and maybe even best and worst practices. 

After all, there's little comfort in knowing that the number four quarterback at BCS-bound State U probably has the raw tools to play in the NFL if you actually happen to be that number four quarterback.  Maybe over the next several posts we can work through throwing mechanics and defense-reading a bit in hopes that the competition for the scarce roster spots will be more robust.

Strategy 101

Let's talk about strategy for a second. 

Now, strategy is a topic near to my heart since, you see, I was a young strategy consultant -- one of the "Kids in the Conference Room" during the mid and late 1990s (that New Yorker article -- linked here again in case you missed the link a dozen words back -- offered some menacing portent for the subsequent "The Smartest Guys in the Room.")  Now, I wasn't one of the McKinsey cats, but I was at another of the "B's and M's" (the en vogue catch-all for the then-hip consulting firms.)  And indeed, that article struck just a bit too close to home, as it kept quoting clients talking about "snot-nosed 25-year olds" and I could take cold comfort from the fact that I was almost 27 at the time.

(It was a great experience, though, and one of the most valuable things I learned during those years was the Mike Porter definition of strategy: "strategy is an integrated set of choices that inform timely action."  You couldn't leave an offsite training confab without being able to recite the definition when asked. The lazy, petulant, or merely hung-over soon found that they could get away simply saying: "informed choice/timely action."  Four words and you were on your way . . . )

And so what?  Well, I'm writing about it because I'm amazed at how often companies confuse strategy and tactics.  Tactics are not strategy; tactics arise from strategy.  I'm seeing this muddling a lot of late.

But I don't want to get pedantic about it; I'm really bringing it up to amplify the concept that strategy is a set of choices.  And choices are about the things that you don't do, as well as about the things you do decide to do.  The problem is that deciding not to do things is hard and, in particular, deciding to take a decision to stop doing things that you're currently doing can be even harder.

As you'll recall, I wrote about focus a while back and it seems now that focus is a lot more critical as 2011 business plans are getting finalized and people are starting to get (maybe?) more optimistic about business conditions.  The temptation exists to start doing a lot of things that weren't being done during times of belt-tightening.  And I'm not saying to not to do those things, rather, I'm asking folks to think about doing things in the context of the inegrated set of choices they're making and how they inform timely action that has the Great End and Real Business of optimizing shareholders' (or stakeholders') success functions.   

 

Private Equity Lessons from the Subway

So I've been riding the New York subways pretty frequently lately.  Between annual meetings, conferences, and the entrepreneurial scene, there's been a lot to do in The Big Apple this fall.  And every time I hop on the train, it takes me back to my childhood.  You see, a quarter-century ago I rode the subway to middle school.  Imagine that: a 12 year old with an overdeveloped sense of adventure and a transit pass that offered unlimited access to the lurid expanses of Metropolis!

(Let me take a moment to apologize to Mr. Criscuolo and my other afternoon-class teachers.  A fake bellyache and a hangdog look was all I needed to get permission from the school nurse to go home after lunch.  And as my time in middle school began to wane, I started scooting out about once a week in an effort to see the entire city, one subway stop at a time . . .)

But, despite my school-skipping, I actually did learn stuff on the subway, my very own classroom on rails.  And who knew I could apply those lessons to private equity and even investing more broadly?  Only recently have some of those lessons come into focus.  Let me run you through five scenarios and their associated learnings in what may be the first in a series of "Lessons From The Subway":

* * *

Scenario #1: Have you ever been barreling through a tunnel on the local train as an express pulls up alongside you between stops?  For several seconds, the two trains hurtle down the tracks together side-by-side before the local starts its inexorable deceleration into the next local station while the express pulls away, charging ahead to the next express stop.  For a moment, there's an intimacy with some of the passengers in the express train.  It's almost a voyeuristic feeling, like looking into someone's living room window; sometimes you even make eye contact with one of the passengers in the other train.  Do not give that person the finger or stick your tongue out or make menacing gestures.  There's a chance that they will get off at the next stop, wait for the local to pull in, and kick your behind.

Lesson: Life is a multi-period interaction.  What happens at one moment resonates into the next.  Even the most random encounters can presage subsequent ones.  Don't be a jerk and always have integrity.  Why soil the canvas?

 

Scenario #2:  Your train pulls into the station on one of those muggy summer days that seem all the hotter and more acrid below ground.  Car after car blurs by, stuffed with people; as the train starts to slow, one car is nearly empty.  But hold on a second; today's not your lucky day, the day you get a seat for the long ride.  Rather, the odds are that the air conditioning simply isn't working and that car is hotter and stuffier than August in Houston.

Lesson: There's information in crowds.  While one never wants to be a lemming, there can be limits to being a contrarian.  Sometimes, leaning against the gales can work, other times, it just gets you windburn and a face full of leaves and other wind-blown detritus.

 

Corollary / Scenario #2a:  Speaking of reasons why cars might be empty, sometimes there's an, ahem, stinky dude on a train car that clears out all the people.  Again, there's a reason that train car is empty and, odds are, that funky cat is going nowhere.

Lesson:  If something stinks, it's likely that the stink will linger, no matter how you try to rationalize away that hinkey feeling about, say, the GP that does't feel right or the story that doesn't quite hang together.  Trust your nose.

 

Scenario #3:  Don’t give the finger to a policeman. Ever.  Catch me sometime offline and I'll tell you a story . . .

Lesson:  The people who make and enforce the laws know and understand them far better than you do.  And even if they're wrong, they're right.  And they can make your day a lot more aggravating than you can imagine.  You get a lot further by smiling and saying "yes, sir" than you do by being petulant.  This may be a good thing for our industry to remember as the shadow of regulation lengthens across our sun-kissed land of private investments.

 

Scenario #4:  If someone starts talking to you on the train, it's likely that they're a looney toon, but there's a chance that they're lost or want to talk about something interesting.  Subway philosophers end up having a lot of things to say, some of which are worthwhile.  Once, though, I talked to old Brit about what to see on holiday and he gave me a 50p coin as a souvenir.  It was the coolest thing I'd ever seen.  Another time a kid told me about a pizzeria over on Ditmas Avenue that had a Space Invaders game that would give you 10 credits if you held the coin return while you put in your quarter.  Needless to say, I became the master of Space Invaders that spring.

Lesson:  Be generous with your time.  You have to be careful, but you never know what you might find out.

 

Scenario #5:  Every mass transit system seems to have a few stops that are central nexuses (nexi?) of the tangle of lines that ferry people to the disrparate and far-flung reaches of their city.  At these stops the trains disgorge their contents and refil with cats connecting to elsewhere.  Jay Street - Borough Hall in Brooklyn was the one that occupied my imagination (where exactly does that exotic A train go?  Why do people write songs about it?) but 42nd Street/Grand Central and Fulton Street/Broadway-Nassau were other such network nodes, full of hurly-burly.  Here's the thing: if you're leaning against the door and not paying attention as the train arrives at one of these stations, you're likely to get pushed out.  And getting back in to your train can be as challenging as swimming upstream with the salmon. 

Lesson: Don't block the exits!  Sometimes, people need to get off the train.  There may indeed be better connection options for them (like West 4th Street,) but sometimes people need a bird in the hand instead of two in the bush.  This is a big concern right now, as I worry that GPs may be suboptimizing exits, but if there's an A train waiting at Jay Street, it probably makes sense to hop off the F train and change, because you never know if you'll wait in vain at West 4th for a delayed A train that never comes . . .

 

 

Office Hours

When I moved to California, people told me I'd miss the seasons.  And indeed, it can be hard to tell when one season bustles aside another; time passes like mellow west coasters waving each other through at a 4-way stop intersection.  But, alas, I've got the unofficial private equity calendar to keep me in tune with the rhythm of nature.  Instead of falling leaves, I always know its autumn when my wallet grows fat with receipts for cab rides and drycleaning claim checks in the far-flung and disparate cities that comprise the LP rota.

And since I'm going to be in the usual haunts with some regularity and a bit of free time, I thought I'd hold office hours for private equity and venture capital GPs who might have random questions about anything from fundraising pitchbooks to annex funds to partnership tumult -- it can be anything that you wanted to confidentially ask a live LP, but were afraid to ask one of your own.   

But here's the deal: no pitching!  Let me be clear: this isn't an opportunity to get in front of me to sell your fund.  Doing so will dump you in the interminable expanse of despair known as my to-do list.  In fact, just like your introductory macroeconomics or organic chemistry professor, I will probably not even remember your name afterwards, but I will take comfort from having been able to dispense a pearl or two of wisdom in 15 minutes or so.

Here's a good description of what to expect, pilfered from some orientation materials at Cornell:

Most professors and teaching assistants do not have lessons planned for office hours. They expect students to “drive” these meetings with their questions and their thoughts . . . Do not be surprised when the professors and teaching assistants reply to your questions with questions of their own. They are working with you to uncover the source of your questions . . .  They may ask you to generate alternative ways to solve a problem. Hopefully they will help you change how you think about the material so that you can answer many different kinds of questions about it – not just the question on the homework that is stumping you. Don’t be surprised if they ask you to solve another problem before you leave the office.

So here's the lineup (you will know me by the crimson of my t-shirt):

[times and locations may change; I'll post updates the day before]

New York City: Weds 10/6 in the Lobby of the Marriott Marquis (1535 B'Way) 1130AM-1PM.

Boston: Thurs 10/7 in the lobby of the Mandarin Oriental (776 Boylston) 6-730PM.

NYC: Tues 11/2 location TBD 1030-noon.

Boston: Thurs 11/4 location TBD 230-4PM.

Chicago: Weds 11/17 in the lobby of the Peninsula (108 E Superior St) 830-1030AM

Dallas: Thurs 11/18 in the lobby of the Rosewood Crescent (400 Crescent Court) 10AM-noon.

I may add a Seattle time and may do a "home game" in Palo Alto.  I look forward to seeing you.

Speak Like the Locals

[Originally written as the guest column for the PEHub Wire, Sept 22, 2010]

In Brooklyn, Old O’Malley would tell us boys about being a Flatbush kid in the Marines in 1942.  He often laughed about meeting hundreds of guys from around America who didn't seem to speak any English.  "Fugghedabouit!  Dose guys all spoke Texan!"

And, indeed, such a language divergence plagues private equity today.  After all, our performance touchstones – quartiles – emphasize the relative in an increasingly absolute world; we’re speaking one dialect and the asset allocators another.  Interestingly, relative metrics gained sway because of the dis-integration of portfolios.  Armed with copies of Pioneering Portfolio Management, asset allocators knew they wanted PE, but they found it challenging to integrate the asset class – with its illiquidity, irregular cashflows, and stale prices – into portfolio analytics.  As a result, this thrilling, but naughty asset became a part of the portfolio, while apart from it in many ways.

Having been a source of illiquid heartache during the downturn, private equity entered its post-heroic phase and many investment committees are contemplating how to re-integrate PE into their portfolios so they can think holistically again; as a result, crises of confidence abound with respect to taking on new commitments.  And perhaps the most serious problem right now is that people around the asset allocation table all speak different languages. 

In fact, a Monday meeting at an endowment or plan sponsor can be like a European Parliament meeting: there's the cat that covers VC, he's speaking a sun-drenched, passionate language analogous to Italian ("sprazzo di sole" has the same hopeful cadence as "cashflow breakeven.")  The real estate manager speaks the frenetic Merseyside Scouse of a BBC sportscaster who's seen too much hooliganism.  Meanwhile, the public market folks speak a frugal Dutch, as they haggle over single basis points in manager fees.  The hedge fund team speaks a precise, formal language that is the finance equivalent of German (too much time thinking about Sortino Ratio can give you weltschmerz, no?)

In such an environment, crowing about top quartile performance, or telling stories about “impact companies” can fall on deaf ears, particularly with the liquid asset constituents of the portfolio still resent that their portfolios were used as ATMs for increasingly frequent PE capital calls between 2004 and 2008.

So how can a GP raising a fund speak in terms that resonate across the portfolio?  First, I think we all in PE need to be more thoughtful in articulating our return expectations while taking an honest accounting of risks.  Focus not just on rear-view performance – which should properly be considered a lagging indicator, not a leading one – but also on implicit assumptions: why are your returns achievable?  In what environments will the fund outperform?  Underperform?    

Said another way, asset allocators live in worlds of probability distributions, observed risks, and well-established performance calculation; they measure and predict performance.  By failing to give thought to their metrics, we are perceived as soft and non-rigorous.  They speak the language of efficiency while we tout inefficiency; they’re from Mars and we’re from Venus.

Remember, PE is a return enhancing asset, one that must be considered in the context of the opportunity cost of equity capital; for asset allocators that cost includes the drag from the cash they have to keep at the ready for PE capital calls. 

To that end, it can be helpful to give people a sense for expectations of capital calls and distributions, with a particular eye toward what one’s doing to accelerate cashflows.  Today, liquidity is prized and it seems most folks are trying to shorten the duration of their portfolios.  Asset allocators worry about facing negative PE cashflows ad infinitum; any visibility into when cash might come back is critical.  After all, there’s nothing like returns to silence critics.  A little “moolah in the coolah” goes a long way toward answering the question on everyone’s lips when it comes to PE: “why bother?”

One View of the Future of VC Allocations

So I'm working on a blog post with some fundraising tips for PE and VC pros that are making the rounds.  The thesis is: you've got to come to meetings armed with better rhetoric, as many institutions have become wildly cynical about private equity strategies after feeling the acute sting of illiquidity during the downturn.  Said another way, people realized that the cost of illiquidity was much higher than they had estimated and many asset allocators are now (re)asking the questions: "are we getting adequately compensated for the risk and illiquidity of privates?" and, more importantly, "why bother?"  Talking about being top quartile will get you nowhere when the person across the table reports to a CIO who's obsessed with the opportunity costs of their capital. 

But before I finished that post, I thought I'd put up a slide deck that I pulled together a few months ago; I've presented variants of this storyline to a few different groups since the beginning of the year.  It's a review of some dynamics that impact institutional investor attitudes towards VC, but I think several of the thoughts are generalizable across private equity. 

Now, I don't think there are necessarily any earth-shattering insights embedded in the slides; it's more of a refresher of first principles.  On the other hand, I continue to be surprised at the number of GPs with whom I speak that think LPs will return en masse with open checkbooks at any moment.  I didn't want to be all gloomy and doom-y, so I tried to end the presentation on a optimistic note, but I do hope that people understand that we've crossed over to a new paradigm that's different from the illiquidity bull market that marked the better part of the last 15 years.  This isn't just a "get-a-mulligan" detour on the way back to 2006; instead, I think the fundraising equilibrium we find over the coming quarters and years will feel a lot more like the tough slogs of the late 80s and early 90s.

I sometimes teach "The Yale Case" (insert reverent pause here,) at business schools and I always open by asking the students what they think the key lessons are.  "Diversification!"  "Equity Bias!"  "Asset Allocation!" come the cries from the well-scrubbed students.  "Nope," I tell them.  "the real lesson of the Yale Case is: don't try this at home . . . "  I fear that many institutions have now learned that lesson the hard way and may be reluctant to return for some time.  And, as always, people will return when they see money being made, but, as with the lottery, the worst time to buy a ticket is typically just after somebody else has won the big jackpot . . .

VC Presentation May 2010

Fat Startups, BMI and The Lorax

So, there I was hanging out in Denver airport again, reading the back-and-forth between Ben Horowitz and Fred Wilson on fat versus thin startups.  They’re both cats that I respect and I think they both make carefully reasoned, nuanced arguments that have far more depth than a quick summary can articulate. 

But all this talk of heft got me thinking about the Body Mass Index; those hip to the BMI calculation know that it's a measure of weight relative to height.  Doctors tend to be fans because it's a decent indicator of body fat which correlates with increased risk of morbidity and mortality.

And BMI tends to work pretty well, except when it doesn't.  For example, serious athletes tend to have more muscle per unit of height than the rest of us and thus have unusually high BMIs: Arnold Schwarzenegger's BMI clocks in at 33 (the "ideal weight range" runs from 18.5 to 24.9).  Even George Clooney clocks in at 29, just shy of the "obese" cutoff of 29.9.

The beauty of muscle, though, is that it's so much more metabolically active than fat.  That's why one can be heavy, but fit; the two are not mutually exclusive.  And  neither, necessarily, are capital efficiency and cash abundance in the startup world.  Indeed, while I do find myself more firmly in Fred's "lean" camp, I am sympathetic to the notion that sometimes a company with a lot of dollars on hand can pivot more quickly as business conditions change, or scale faster to discourage new entrants or build competitive advantages that give them a leg up on existing rivals.  Companies can be well-funded but hungry.  I get it.

But here's my question: sure, bigger companies can earn bigger exits, but if they burn more cash on the way to a big outcome, isn't it almost inevitable that return multiples will be depressed?  Indeed, there can be some positive externalities associated with a big outcome, but as an LP -- the money behind the money -- what I care most about is multiple on investment.  I'm focused on the numerator and the denominator.

And then I started thinking about some of the cleavages of interest that may arise from fatter startups.  Most directly, the dollar value of carry to a GP of 2x outcome on a $100 million investment is greater than that of a 5x on $10 million.  I know which outcome I would rather have, but I'm not sure that a random GP's answer would be the same.  Then you get into non-economic motivations: having big outcomes can help build a brand, almost regardless of the profits.  Few people know what multiple Sequoia, for example, generated on Cisco's IPO twenty years ago, It could be a 100x, or it could be a 2x.  Most likely, it's somewhere in between, but either way it's an awfully spiffy logo to have on the web page.  Entrepreneurs, too, can get a lot of jazz from landing a big round of funding; it's an endorsement of their idea and the vote of confidence that makes for good press releases and generates respect.

Further, aiming to build a large enterprise fundamentally changes a startup's optionality profile.  No longer are a wide range of exit scenarios compelling; suddenly, a happy outcome for all becomes limited to one of the handful of large exits that take place in a given year.  With expectations of a modest number of IPOs (which I fear is a structural thing,) and a few dozen M&A transactions in excess of $250M, all those fat startups are like so many well-prepped high school seniors looking to land a spot at Top College.  It's just tough arithmetic.  It may be a fun ride for the entrepreneurs and GPs, but it can be nerve-racking for us LPs at the tail end of the whip.

And the risks are different, as well.  "Fatter" startups imply either fewer portfolio investments or larger funds (or perhaps even imbalanced funds where a few large bets compete for GP time with many small ones).  None of these are particularly positive outcomes for fund investors. 

I could go on, but it would start to stress me out.  And one of my sources of stress is that entrepreneurs and GPs are pretty well represented in these discussions, but we LPs tend to be distant observers.  Who speaks for us? I wondered out loud.  And just at that moment a little man appeared out of the breeze:

[With apologies to Dr. Seuss]

“Mister!” he said with a sawdusty sneeze,
“I am the Lorax.  I speak for LPs
I speak for LPs for LPs have no tongues.
And I’m asking you sir, at the top of my lungs” –
He was extremely upset as he warned retribution –
“What’s that THING they have done with our cash contribution?”

“Look, Lorax,” I said, “it's easy to get crotchety.
GPs deploy billions; it sometimes still bothers me.
In fact,” I continued, “some think it’s a lottery.
A lottery whose tickets can be a new social network,
A diversion to give cube-dwellers ways to shuck work.
But it has other uses.  No, we’re not out of the woods.
You can use it to serve ads or sell virtual goods.
Or crowdsource a date or find homes in new ‘hoods.”

The Lorax said,
“Sir! You are crazy from drinking the potion.
There is no one on earth who would buy that fool notion!”

But the very next moment we were shown to be wrong.
For, just at that moment, a ‘tween came along.
And she thought that the club we’d just ridiculed was great.
She happily subscribed for thirty-three ninety-eight.

I laughed with the Lorax.  “You poor stupid guy!
You never can tell what some people will buy.”

“I repeat,” cried the Lorax,
“I speak for LPs!”

“All GPs are top quartile,” I told him.
“Those marks are a tease.”

DC-8s and Tigers and GPs! Oh my!

A few weeks ago, a local TV station aired a news story about a mostly-forgotten plane crash, the May, 1968 unintentional ditching of JAL Flight 2 in San Francisco Bay.  After an uneventful flight from Tokyo, the nearly-new DC-8, nicknamed "Shiga," was on final approach to an overcast SFO.  Captain Kohei Asoh, a veteran pilot, guided Shiga's descent through the low-hanging clouds.  But planning errors, equipment unfamiliarity, and miscalculations conspired against the crew.  Dropping out of the fog, Shiga was lower than expected and about to crash into the foam-flecked bay just below.  By the time the First Officer cried out, "pull up!" and Captain Asoh applied throttle, it was too late.  The landing gear had struck the brackish water and the plane lurched to a halt, the wheels coming to rest in the muck seven feet below -- two and a half miles short of the threshold of Runway 28 left.

Remarkably, no one was hurt and some passengers had no idea that they had landed in the water until the evacuation began.  And even then, the de-planing was so uneventful that most folks didn't even get their feet wet.  But for me, the best part of the story was popularized by management guru, Jerry Harvey (author of the Abilene Paradox): when Captain Asoh was called before the Transportation Safety Board, the inquisitors opened by asking how an experienced pilot flying a sound airplane on a straight line to an unobstructed runway in generally benign conditions could land in the water miles short of the field?  Offering an answer that resounds across the ages in its clarity and honesty, the Captain replied, "as you Americans say, 'Asoh f@#%ed up.' "

Fast forward 40 years and compare Captain Asoh to the bellyaching finger-pointers that were in the cockpit of the Northwest flight that overflew Minneapolis.  And the public nature of Captain Asoh's taking of responsibility stands in stark contrast to the recent (ahem) screw-ups of Tiger Woods.  Look, I'm not a moralizer or a scold -- I grew up in the anti-role model era heralded by Charles Barkley and Ice Cube -- but Tiger, dude, you make your living by having people look at you; you get paid because people watch what you do.  I'm not sure you get to flick that switch off by pleading for privacy.  Even if you ask, "pretty please."

And what does this have to do with investing?  Recently, I was talking to a buddy who's a GP at an LBO shop (this conversation was explicitly cleared for the blog on the condition of vagueness -- I should note that it's not a group in which I'm an investor).  This GP bemoaned the fact that his LPs had seemingly thrown in the towel on his troubled fund; turnout had been sparse at this year's annual meeting and some investors had stopped returning phone calls.  He insisted that they had Great Stories of Progress to tell for each of their troubled portfolio companies and that if they could just convey these stories to LPs, all would be well.  How, he asked, could he communicate the exciting stuff afoot? 

So I asked him to test drive some of the rap on me.  After a few tales larded with lament over difficult (but improving!) end markets, missteps by (recently replaced!) management teams, and (impossible to please!) crabby lenders, I asked him how many times they'd screwed up in the fund?  Now I don't mean to be harsh, but here's what I heard for the next 90 seconds: "excuse excuse excuse blah blah blah excuse excuse excuse blah blah blah."  No wonder his LPs have tuned out his firm's fund, I told him; I'd just been handed a bagful of excuses devoid of any corresponding accountability or responsibility.  It was the first time I'd heard the fund's story and I was already tired of it.

Look, LPs understand that business has been tough and even the tightest investment theses have been severely tested over the last 18 months.  We get that.  And we also know that investors are fallible.  It's OK to make mistakes sometimes.  Really it is.  Sometimes even good decisions have bad outcomes and vice-versa (more on that next week).  Sometimes people are just unlucky or in the right place at the wrong time.  But when things head south, please be honest and straightforward.  (There's no need to take things to an extreme and self-flagellate, like some GPs do.  There's no joy in that for anyone.)  As GPs and LPs, we're in a long term relationship -- one that's longer than many marriages.  An open, honest, transparent dialogue pays dividends in the long term. 

So my GP buddy asked me for some advice once I climbed down off of my soap box.  The best I could come up with was, "just remember, it's not the break-in that brings down the presidency, it's the cover up."  Sometimes, like Captain Asoh, you've just gotta say, "I f@#%ed up."